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Of
DONALD CHAD HUSBAND,

Appellate Court Nc

930291-CA

Deceased

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY A N D RULE
CONSTRUCTION THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Ann
1

s 7L; 1-102, infra.

•

intra.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HA S I I DT "'! U I EE I IIS R 1 3H1 TC A PPEA I ,„ NOR IS THE
APPEAL MOOT.
Respondent entitles Point I of their brief, page 1 5 , as
:: o... I ows: " Appe 11 ai

. L ^ ,-.

Receipt and Release".
Waiver has been defined and restated by the Utah Supreme
Court in Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
935 (Utah 1993) as follows:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right.
To constitute waiver, there
must be an existing right, benefit or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish i t
(citing cases)
We further clarify
that the intent
relinquish a right must be distinct.

to

Therefore, Respondents must show that the execution of the Receipt
and Release by Appellant: (R 6 90) coi ist::i tn ites tl le ai moui iceinei it c f ai I
existing right, Appellant's right to appeal, Appellant's knowledge

of the right to appeal and Appellant's distinct intention to
relinquish the said right of appeal.
Nowhere in the Estate Closing Order (R.683-688) or the
Receipt and Release or in any other documentation is there a
reference to Appellant's right to appeal much less his distinct
intention to waive the right of appeal.
Respondents are also trying to elevate the Receipt and
Release to the status of an independent document having a life of
its own to be construed under the "Four Corners Rule." The Receipt
and Release is a part of the Estate Closing Order and is therein
referred to as having been received and in fact is the basis for
the signing of the Estate Closing Order by the Court.

The Estate

Closing Order is specifically referred to as being appealed in
Appellant's Notice of Appeal. (R.691)
Respondents argue from the case of Krauss v. Utah State
Dept. of Transportation, 852 P. 2d 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) at page
15 of their brief, "[F]or a release to be enforceable, it must at
minimum be unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal."
The entire text of the Receipt and Release (R.690) is as
follows:
The undersigned, Dylon Husband, as distributee
and heir of the above estate hereby:
1,

Acknowledges receipt from JERRALD D.
CONDER and JOHN SPENCER SNOW, the
personal representative of the above
named decedent, of all property to which
distributee is entitled from the estate.

2.

Accepts such property in full payment and
satisfaction
of
the
undersigned's
interest in the estate.
2

3-;

Releases the personal representatives and
the estate from any and all liability in
connection
with
the
undersigned's
interest in the estate.
(Emphasis
added.)

This is hardly an "unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal" waiver or
release of Appellant's right of appeal contemplated in the case
cited.
Likewise, the requirements for an accord and satisfaction
are set forth in the case of Lawrence Construction Co. vs.
Holmquist, 692 P.2d 382, 384 as follows:
1.
2.
3.

A proper subject matter;
Competent parties;
An assessment or meeting of the minds of the
parties;

4.

Consideration given for the record.

An accord and satisfaction requires a meeting of the
minds of the parties. The text of the Receipt and Release, supra,
is once again called to the attention of the Court.
There is clearly no assent or meeting of the minds of the
parties in the above text insofar as Appellant waiving his right to
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. All acknowledgements, payments
in full and satisfaction and releases from liability have to do
with the closing of the estate and nothing to do with the waiver of
the right of appeal.
Appellant was entitled to and received the personal
property and cash from the estate pursuant to the Estate Closing
Order and not the Receipt and Release. Receipt of the property and
negotiating the check for $9,958.99 provides no consideration for
the purported accord, waiver or release of the right to appeal.
3

Appellant's

acceptance

of

the

benefits

was

under

compulsion. If Appellant failed to sign the "Receipt and Release,"
he would not be provided with the balance of personal property not
yet delivered or would not have received his check.

See Exhibit 1

to Appellant's Response to Suggestion of Mootness; see Exhibits
"C, " "E," and "G" to Appellee's Suggestion of Mootness.
The issue of the check on January 6, 1992 was also a
proposition

of no

fax by Appellant's

attorney

approving

the

"Acknowledgement of Receipt of Funds" and no signature by Appellant
on the "Acknowledgement of Receipt of Funds," there was to be no
check given to Appellant. See Exhibit 2 to Appellant's Response to
Suggestion of Mootness; see Exhibit "I" to Appellee's Suggestion of
Mootness.
The issue of mootness of an appeal has been before the
Utah Appellate Courts and other appellate courts throughout the
country for at least 130 years. The authorities generally refer to
the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine and are as follows:
A*

General Rule.

As a general rule the acceptance-of-the-benefits doctrine
would preclude a party who accepted the benefits of a Judgment or
Order from Appealing the said Judgment or Order.
Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987) and Cignolani v.
Utah Power & Light CO., 790 P.2d 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
B.

Exception-Appeal for a Larger Amount.

This exception is recognized in 169 A.L.R. 985, 1026 as
follows:
4

"...if the appeal or assignment of error is
such as to confine the review, and the
possible further proceedings resulting from
it, to the right of the party to an additional
amount, his acceptance of the share awarded
him will not bar his right to the review.***
The usual case in which the distributee does
not lose his right of appeal by accepting his
share is that in which he contests the credits
allowed the distributor; for example, where
his objection is to items of losses or
expenses in an administrator's account.
There is one condition to this exception which is also
set forth in 169 A.L.R. 95, 1026 as follows:
Conversely, if the review is such as to
involve the possibility that any part of the
share
accepted
may
go
to
the
other
distributees
or
be
returned
to
the
distributor, the party is barred by his
acceptance.
The award of the personal property and cash award in the
sum of $9,958.99 to Appellant are not put in issue by Appellant's
Appeal nor are these specific awards to Appellant challenged in the
Crossappeals of Appellees per their brief on appeal. The foregoing
condition is subject to another exception as explained in 169
A.L.R. 95, 1018 as follows:
But in such cases the right of review is not
absolutely conditional upon the acceptors's
right to what he has received being outside
the issues raised on appeal, or beyond danger
of being retried. It means that the right to
what he has received shall not be put in
jeopardy by his own proceeding. It may still
be endangered by his opponent's cross appeal,
or cross assignments of error, where such are
possible under the practice. (emphasis added)
Neither Appellant's Appeal nor Appellee's Crossappeal
directly challenge the award of personal property and cash to
5

Appellant and, therefore, this condition of the exception is
fulfilled.
This exception to the general rule has been applied to
heirs, claimants, and other distributees of probate estates since
the

early times.

In

case of Hiabe v. Westlake, 14 N.Y. 281 (1856)

New York Court of Appeals held as follows at 14 N.Y. 288:
There is no weight in the objection that the
creditors who appealed had received their
dividends under the decree of the surrogate.
(Clowes v. Dickenson, 8 Cow., 328, 331.) They
were certainly entitled to the amount paid
them, and there was no inconsistency on their
part in receiving that amount, and then
appealing for the purpose of obtaining a
reduction of the allowance for expenses, which
would give them a further divided.
Likewise in the case of In Re Claris Estate. 213 P. 222
(1923), the California Supreme Court held at 212 P.624 as follows:
It is well settled that an appellant is not
precluded from maintaining an appeal for the
purpose of establishing a greater claim where
it appears that he is entitled to that which
he has accepted but is claiming something
more.
The following appears at 169 A.L.R. 986, 1026:
And where a plaintiff claimed by inheritance
one half an estate, but the court held him
entitled to only one fourth, he was held
entitled to maintain an appeal notwithstanding
he had accepted distribution of the one-fourth
interest that interest not being controverted.
Mudd v. Perry (1928; CCA 8th) 25 F.2d 85 (writ
of certiorari denied in (1928) 278 US 601, 73
L ed 529, 49 S Ct. 9).
The Appeal of Appellant is maintained to recover a larger
amount of money for the heirs and is properly brought.
C.

Exception-Separate
6

and

Distinct

Orders

and/or

Judgments.
Another exception to the general rule is set forth in the
case of Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1973)
at 514 P.2d 1143 as follows:
If a judgment is entered as to one part of a
controversy, which is separate and distinct
from another part, and the disposition of the
latter cannot affect the disposition of the
former, a party may accept the money or
property to which he is entitled, and not be
deemed to waive his right to appeal as to
other independent claims which the court
refused to grant.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order signed
and entered on February 7, 1992 awarded Conder & Wangsgard, as
claimants, $34,038.81 at attorney's fees for services rendered
Decedent prior to his death.

The Order was separate and distinct

from the Estate Closing Order entered on October 19, 1992.

The

Petition for Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution was not
even filed until April 20, 1992.
If Appellant was to prevail in whole or in part on his
issue then there would be additional money (property) for the heirs
upon remand and a new Personal Representative could be appointed
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1008, infra, to collect the said
property in whole or in part from Conder & Wangsgard.
D.

Utah Cases.

The Utah

cases

that

adopted

the acceptance-of-the-

benefits doctrine, Trees v. Lewis, supra, and Cianolani v. Utah
Power and Light Co. . supra, are clearly distinguishable on the
facts from the case at bar.

Trees v. Lewis was a specific
7

performance action lost by seller who unsuccessfully attempted to
appeal after giving possession of the subject property to buyer and
accepting the purchase price therefor.

Cianolani was two cases

where plaintiffs were awarded judgments against defendant Utah
Power, which were paid and accepted by plaintiffs who then,
unsuccessfully attempted to appeal.
Cianolani, supra, contains the following language at 790
P.2d 1221:
The general rule requiring dismissal of cases
in which the issues have become moot is the
product advisory opinions.
(citing cases)
Where mootness is the suggested basis for
application of the acceptance-of-the-benefits
doctrine, our focus is not on appellant's
intent or on the opposing party's reliance on
appellant's conduct.
Instead, we must
determine whether an appellant's conduct in
accepting the benefits of, or in acquiescing
in, the judgment or order appealed from has
rendered our resolution of the issues on
appeal a purely academic exercise.
'If the
requested judicial relief cannot affect the
rights of the litigants, the case is moot...'
The Court of Appeals then concluded at 790 P.2d 1222:
There is no longer any settlement money on
deposit with the clerk of the district court,
and there is no basis on which either the
trial court or a party successful on appeal
could compel the other party's return of the
disbursed funds to the district court for
redistribution.
There was a key consideration in the court's decision to dismiss
the appeal.
This case is a probate matter and the Utah Uniform
Probate Code provides the following in Utah Code Ann. §75-3-1008:
If other property of the estate is discovered
after an estate has been settled and the
8

personal representative discharged or after
one year after a closing statement has been
filed, the court upon petition of any
interested person and upon notice as it
directs may appoint the same or a successor
personal representative to administer the
subsequently discovered estate.
If a new
appointment is made, unless the court orders
otherwise, the provisions of this code apply
as appropriate; but no claim previously barred
may
be
asserted
in
the
subsequent
administration.
So, when this Court reverses in whole or in part some of
the improper, excessive and exorbitant attorney's fees awarded
Conder & Wangsgard and sends the case back to District Court, a new
personal

representative

can be appointed

to pursue Conder &

Wangsgard for a return of some of the fees and there is a remedy
for Appellant and the matter does not amount to giving an advisory
opinion.
The Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant appeals the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of February 7, 1992
in addition to the Estate Closing Order.
Respondents
appeal

which

administrations.

have

further
a

No so.

claim that

chilling

effect

allowing Appellant's
on

future

estate

The main thrust of the appeal is

challenging the claim against the Estate by Conder & Wangsgard, the
Conder thereof being a co-personal representative of the Estate, in
the sum of $37,820.81 of which $34,038.81 was finally allowed by
the Court.

(R. 431-438).

Personal Representatives did not seek a

ruling under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to start
the appeal time running which they most certainly would have
received.
9

Thus, the largest single item being challenged on appeal
is the claim allowed by the trial court which due to the neglect of
the Personal Representatives was left open for the final appeal
from the Estate Closing Order.
with

a surcharge

of

The remainder of the appeal deals

Personal Representatives

in the

sum of

$1,337.30 and a challenge to the amount of Personal Representatives
attorney's fees of which $5,000.00 was disallowed by the trial
court.

See Point III, Appellant's brief, page 29.
Thus, the chilling effect of this case on future estate

administration if at all, is due (1) to the neglect of Personal
Representatives in failing to obtain a 54(b) ruling on the claim
decided in February, 1992, and (2) the greed, avarice, dishonesty,
lying under oath, breach of fiduciary duty and general mishandling
of Decedent's estate. Personal Representative Jerrald D. Conder of
Conder & Wangsgard testified at R. 1467 as follows:
Mr. Husband [Decedent] was -- you have to
understand, he was at our office probably
three times a week either on a friendly basis,
either there drinking with us, either there
planning a fishing trip, being at the swimming
pool, he was our close personal friend and he
know what that billing was.
And again at R. 1425 as follows:
I was concerned initially that Whitey's
[Decedent's] children [including Appellant]
were taken care of.
Finally at R. 1120 as follows:
...you must understand that Mr. Husband
[Decedent] was one my best and dearest friends.
The law firm of Conder & Wangsgard received a total of
$68,409.96 representing the claim, attorney's fees and Personal
10

Representative

fees

(which were allowed at the same rate as

attorney's fees) and paralegal costs out of an estate with a total
value of $155,784.83 of which $53,158.56 went to both heirs.

(R.

437, 438, 459, 683-688)
With friends like Conder probating your estate, you
certainly don't need any enemies.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW THAT THE CONDER & WANGSGARD CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST THE ESTATE IN THE SUM OF $37,820.81 WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
(75-3-804) AND TIMELY FILED (75-3-803).
The language from Dementes v. Estate of Tallas. 764 P.2d
628 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) quoted at page 27 of Respondent's brief is
inapposite in that it refers to "a claim not yet due."

Thus, the

disavowal of "undue precision" refers to claims not yet due.

The

claim of Conder & Wangsgard against the estate was due and payable
long before Decedent's death.
Respondents and the Court of Appeals rely heavily on the
preamble to Utah Code Ann. §75-1-102 (1975) in divining a liberal
construction to the presentation of creditors claims.
The full text of 75-1-102 (1975) is as follows:
75-1-102. Purposes -- Rule of construction.
(1) This code shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code
are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law
concerning the affairs of decedents,
missing persons, protected persons,
minors, and incapacitated persons;
11

(b) To discover and make effective the
intent of a decedent in distribution of
his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient
system for administering the estate of
the decedent and making distribution to
his successors;
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of
certain trusts; and
(e) To make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions.
Thus, the underlying purpose and policies of this statute
make no express reference to creditors claims.

It is submitted

that the language of Utah Code Ann. §78-3-803 and 804 is mandatory
and should be given a reasonably strict construction in order to
protect decedent's estates and the heirs and devisees and provide
for the expeditious probate, distribution and closing of the same.
Respondents' brief claims at page 33: "Dylon is again
disingenuous when he states, 'There is not on scintilla or iota of
evidence to support Finding of Fact 8'."
Finding of Fact 8 (R. 435) is a follows:
8.
The individual entries on Exhibit 3, time
record of Jerrald D. Conder for services
rendered for Decedent in the Deep Power
litigation, were made and entered on Exhibit 3
at the time of the service was performed for
Decedent.
Conder's testimony at (R. 1031-1032) has to do with the totals
placed on Exhibit 3 and nothing to do with individual entries in
Exhibit 3 and when they were made.

To reiterate, there is not a

scintilla or iota of evidence to support Finding of Fact 8.

In

fact, Conder's affidavit states that Exhibit 3 was not prepared
until shortly after his appointment as Personal Representative. (R.
383, 384; 1044-1048)
12

The claim of Conder & Wangsgard about a secured claim and
their attorney's lien at page 34 and 35 of their brief is being
raised for the first time on appeal. This should not be considered
by the court as it was not raised and articulated in the court
below.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDER AT THE JUNE 14, 1991 HEARING.
The precipitate for Conder7s re-redirect examination was
not to clarify his earlier quandary as to when the fees were
totaled but on cue from the trial court in assessing the state of
the evidence at (R.1029), page 24 of Appellant's brief.

It was

evident that there was no claim or formal claim filed before
September 24, 1990. Conder's testimony in the morning of June 14,
1991 supported this assessment of the posture of the case by the
trial court.
The

trial

court

allowed

Conder

to

testify

in the

afternoon session over the objection of Appellant's counsel without
giving any reason therefor. (R. 1030)

Over the further objection

to Appellant's attorney and a Motion to Strike on the grounds that
Conder was trying to correct his testimony (a euphemism for lying
under oath) the trial court responded, "He has a right to do that
on redirect."

(emphasis added) (R. 1034)

This was an abuse of

discretion on the part of trial court allowing the re-redirect when
there was no recross examination.

Further, the clarification or

correction of testimony went to his direct examination. This abuse
13

of discretion was harmful to Appellant because it improperly
allowed

Conder

to make

the

claim more

colorable

under

the

requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 803 and 804.
POINT IV
THE

COURT

ERRED

IN

FAILING

TO

SURCHARGE

PERSONAL

REPRESENTATIVE CONDER FOR THE INTEREST NOT EARNED BY HIS FAILURE TO
DEPOSIT ESTATE FUNDS IN AN INTEREST BEARING ACCOUNT.
In the hearing

on January

15, 1991 on Appellant's

Petition to Remove Conder as Personal Representative of the Estate,
the trial court ruled summarily from the Bench, that the estate
funds were to be put in an interest bearing account. (R. 903)
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED
INSTEAD

OF

$11,550.00

IN DETERMINING THAT ONLY $5,000.00

IN ATTORNEY'S

FEES

WERE

INCURRED

IN

PROSECUTING THE CLAIM OF CONDER & WANGSGARD FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THE SUM OF $37,820.81.
On June 15, 1992 a hearing was held setting a further
hearing on June 23, 1992. (R. 581)

On June 19, 1992 Appellant's

attorney submitted a statement and analysis of attorney's fees to
be used in the hearing held on June 23, 1992. (R. 582-594)

A

further hearing was held on these attorney's fees on August 20,
1992 and the matter of these attorney's fees submitted to the court
at that time. (R. 1565, 1566)
At the request of the trial court, Appellant's attorney
sent to the trial court on September 2, 1992 the requested
documents and a copy of the documents were sent to Conder &
14

Wangsgard. (R. 649-663)

Thus, the ex parte documents referred to

at page 43 of Respondents' brief were not ex parte. This issue of
attorney's fees was finally determined by the trial court by minute
entry on November 24, 1992.

(R. 664, 665)
CONCLUSION

This appeal is properly before the court and is not moot
for any reason. The award of $37,820.81 to Conder & Wangsgard for
attorney's fees was error and should be reversed. The trial court
abused its discretion regarding the admission of the re-redirect
testimony of Conder and Appellant should be awarded a new trial.
The

court

should

find

a

duty

on

the

part

of

Personal

Representatives to deposit estate funds they are holding in an
interest bearing account and Personal Representative Conder should
be surcharged for the amount of interest lost for this failure to
do so. This ruling of the court should be reversed.

The evidence

is overwhelming that Conder & Wangsgard spent $11,500.00 worth of
time processing their claim against the estate and the ruling of
the trial court disallowing only $5,000.00 should be reversed and
the full amount of $11,500.00 should entered as a disallowance as
against Conder & Wangsgard as a matter of law.

The court should

order proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 1008 to recover whatever
attorney's

fees are disallowed on this appeal from Conder &

Wangsgard.
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) .
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
VI.
Whether the trial court properly concluded that the
attorney's fee claim of Conder & Wangsgard should be discounted by
10%.
This is an issue involving a question of law which should
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to
said ruling.

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) .

Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard. Robb
v. Anderton. 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
VII.
Whether the trial court properly awarded Appellant's
attorney $1,000.00 for his services to the estate.
This is an issue involving a question of law which should
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to
said ruling.

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm., 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) .

Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard.
v. Anderton. 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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VIII.
Whether the trial court properly disallowed the postfuneral final party at the Fort Douglas-Hidden Valley Country Club.
This is an issue involving a question of law which should
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to
said ruling.

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm. . 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) .

Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard.

Robb

v. Anderton, 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
IX.
Whether the trial court was correct in not charging any
of the Co-Personal Representatives attorney's fees to Appellant
Dylon Husband.
This is an issue involving a question of law which should
be reviewed for its correctness with no particular deference to
said ruling.

Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm., 198 UAR 5 (Utah 1992) .

Any findings of fact upon which the said conclusions of law is
based is to be determined by the clearly erroneous standard.
v. Anderton, 225 UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
CONSTITUTION, STATUTORY AND RULE DETERMINATION
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE ISSUES.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-102.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-1008.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
See Appellant's Brief, page 3.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
See Appellant's Brief, page 4.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT VI
The evidence is ample to support the trial court's
finding that the Conder & Wangsgard fee should be discounted 10%
and in fact there was no evidence contradicting the supplemental
agreement of Conder and Decedent to allow the payment of the
attorney's fees by a remodel job on the Conder & Wangsgard office.
POINT VII
There is ample evidence to support the award of $1,000.00
as attorney's fees for the reduction of the Conder & Wangsgard fee
by $3,782.08.

In addition, the award made by the trial court was

for services rendered to the estate without reference to the
foregoing which services included the disallowance of the $1,722.71
claim for the "final party" and the $5,000.00 disallowed as against
Conder & Wangsgard estate attorney's fees which is an additional
benefit

to

the estate

$10,504.79.

of

$6,722.21

for a total benefit

of

The award of $1,000.00 to Appellant's attorney is

supported by the evidence and is a reasonable and proper charge
against the estate.
POINT VIII
The cost of the alleged "wake" was $1,722.71 and was
organized

by

Conder

before

his

appointment

as

Personal

Representative and in advance consultation with everyone else
except the heirs and their conservators.

See Exhibit 9.

The

"final party" was for non-church goers that abhorred the church
funeral

and

for whom

Relief

Society
18

punch

and

cookies

was

unacceptable.

This was not a continuation of the funeral, but a

"final party11 that "pandered to the appetite of the living under
the pretense of honoring the dead."
disallowed

against

the

estate

and

The claim was properly
reallocated

against

the

responsible parties.
POINT IX
The

surcharges

were

either

allowed,

on

appeal

or

disallowed and in any event there was significant evidence to
support them all. The claim for Conder & Wangsgard attorney's fees
for services rendered Decedent prior to his death was brought
before the court on the Personal Representative's petition for
Conder & Wangsgard because of Mr. Snow's failure to fulfill his
duties as Co-Personal Representative under the stipulation. All of
Appellant's actions regarding the estate were taken in good faith,
were meritorious or debatable and the trial court finding of no
basis to award fees against Appellant is supported by overwhelming
evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE ATTORNEY'S
FEE CLAIM BY CONDER & WANGSGARD SHOULD BE REDUCED BY 10% BASED ON
MULTIPLE FINDINGS OF FACT AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court made the following findings of fact
relating to this issue at (R. 431-436):
2.
In 1985 Decedent and Jerrald D. Conder of
Conder & Wangsgard entered into an oral
agreement whereby Conder & Wangsgard would
provide legal services to Decedent for $105.00
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per hour. There is no written agreement, note
or memorandum of this agreement.
3.
A further oral agreement was entered into
between Jerrald D. Conder of Conder &
Wangsgard and Decedent whereby Decedent would
be allowed to provide remodeling construction
for the offices of Conder & Wangsgard as
credit against legal services provided by
Conder & Wangsgard.
5.
The remodeling job to be performed by
Decedent was contemplated and plans had been
drawn but was not performed because of the
sudden death of Decedent on May 27, 1990.
14. There was a conflict of interest between
Jerrald D. Conder of Conder & Wangsgard and
Jerrald
D.
Conder
as
the
Personal
Representative of the Estate of Donald Chad
Husband because of the (1) large claim of
Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's fees and (2)
and because Jerrald D. Conder as Personal
Representative assumed control of Chad Husband
Construction Company, Inc. which was supposed
to provide the remodel job of the Conder &
Wangsgard offices on payment of the legal
services provided by Conder & Wangsgard.
Jerrald D. Conder took no steps as Personal
Representative to have the remodel job
performed.
15. If Decedent's construction company had
performed the remodeling job on the offices of
Conder & Wangsgard, Decedent would have earned
a profit of 10% on the $37,820.81 claims by
Conder & Wangsgard and is entitled to a credit
therefor.
All of Conder's testimony cited by Respondent's Brief at page 46
supports findings of fact 2 and 3.

Conder went on to testify at

[By Mr. Conder]
At the time he died there was plans for him to
do a remodel.
Q.
That's right. He was going do the remodel, wasn't
he, to pay for the attorney's fees.
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A.
What would have happened there, yes, at the time he
died we had plans drawn for a remodel and we didn't know
yet what the total cost of the remodel would be. But
there was a plan that Mr. Husband would accomplish that
remodel and there would be a credit on his bill, that we
would agree upon some credit on the bill, yes.
Conder's affidavit (R. 382-386) corroborates and directly supports
his foregoing testimony.

(R. 383)

The trial court then ruled at (R. 1295) :
The Court: But that wasn't the deal. The
deal was that I will exchange my services for
your services.
Mr. Bennett:
Well, that was one of the
alternative ways. It was never agreed that it
was the only way it could be done.
The Court:
He TConderl said that was the
agreement. There was nothing to the contrary.
I have no evidence to the contrary. (emphasis
added)
Thereafter, the trial court directed the parties to
submit affidavits on the amount of the discount to be applied to
the claim for attorney's fees which was accomplished by the
parties. (R. 396-399; 401-408)

On January 21, 1992, the trial

court made a detailed ruling on the determination of the 10%
discount. (R. 1327-1329) Cross-Appellant's brief, page 48, objects
to the trial court's use of the case of Dixie State Bank v. Bracken
764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988) to order a 10% reduction in fees.
trial merely remembered at
Bracken,

The

(R. 941) that Dixie State Bank v.

supra, sets forth the criteria

for determining the

reasonableness of fees.
Cross-Appellant's brief then state at page 48:
Dixie sets forth the standards for courts to
use in determining reasonable fees for a fee
21

award. The Conder & Wangsgard claim was not a
fee award but was a creditor claim already
outstanding against the estate.
However, the Conder & Wangsgard creditor claim was for attorney's
fees and to claim that Dixie State Bank, supra, is not applicable
is ridiculous.

Nowhere in the record did the trial court reduce

the award by 10% based on the Dixie State Bank case, supra.

The

10% reduction is based on the testimony of Conder and his affidavit
above referred to and cited.
Cross-Appellant' s have failed to marshall the facts in
support of findings of fact 2, 3, 5, 14 and 15, and demonstrate
"that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences therefrom
are insufficient to support the findings."

Robb v. Anderton, 225

UAR 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The trial court's factual determinations as set forth in
findings of fact 2, 3, 5, 14 and 15 are essentially undisputed and
the discount of the Conder & Wangsgard claim for fees was legally
correct and should be affirmed.
POINT VII
APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY WAS ENTITLED TO THE $1,000.00 AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR HIS SERVICES TO THE ESTATE.
Findings of fact 13 and 14 (R. 677) of the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on October 19, 1992 (R. 672682) found that the estate benefited by $3,782.08 representing the
discount of 10% from the Conder & Wangsgard award of attorney's
fees.

Appellant's attorney was awarded $1,000.00 therefor.
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However, the minute entry upon which Finding of Fact 13
and 14 are based (R. 664, 665) states as follows:
Since the estate benefited as a result of Mr.
Abies efforts the court awards Mr. Abies
$1,000.00 for his service.
The services rendered the estate by Appellant's attorney
go far beyond the reduction of $3,782.08 of the Conder & Wangsgard
fees.

The services include the challenging and surcharge of the

estate and Lindsay Husband of $1,722.71 for the post-funeral final
party

(Point VIII, infra) and the $5,000.00 disallowed solely

through the efforts of Appellant's Attorney from the $11,550.00
originally asserted improperly against the Estate.
supra.)

(See Point V,

The trial court ruled as follows at (R. 767):
The Court: I understand what happened there
because I ruled on it. The estate did benefit
the difference between the claim and the
amount of the discount, so it was some benefit
to the estate.

Thus, the estate benefited by the efforts of Appellant's counsel in
increasing the amount available to the heirs by the total sum of
$10,504.79.

This was what the court was aware of when it made its

minute entry, supra.
It is submitted that the award of $1,000.00 as attorney's
fees to Appellant's attorney is overwhelmingly reasonable in light
of the criteria set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, supra.
Cross-Appellant's have failed to marshall the facts in
support of Findings of Fact 13 and 14 and demonstrate "that the
evidence in common, including all reasonable inferences therefrom
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are insufficient to support the findings."

Robb v. Anderton,

supra.
POINT VIII
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S DISALLOWANCE OF THE $1,722.71
COSTS OF THE POST-FUNERAL FINAL PARTY AND THE REALLOCATION OF ITS
COST TO CONDER & WANGSGARD AND KAREN HUSBAND IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE
EVIDENCE.
Decedent died on May 27, 1990 (R. 2) and his funeral was
held at a Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints ward on May
31, 1990. (R. 790) Decedent had a membership in the Fort DouglasHidden

Valley

Country

Club

which

was

sold

as

part

of

the

administration of the estate for the sum of $1,318.00. (R. 78)
Conder, before he was named personal representative,
organized a post-funeral party to be held at the aforesaid country
club. (R. 790, 791)

Conder testified that he consulted with the

Decedent's father and mother, brother and sister, the sister's
husband, and Decedent's fiancee, girlfriend, live-in or whatever,
about holding a party at the Hidden Valley Country Club (R. 790)
He further testified at (R. 791) :
A.
It was a joint idea. ***and it was
consensus among the group that that would be
an appropriate function in honor of Chad's
life.
Q.
Well, who was going to pay for this? You weren't
personal representative on May 31, 1990. Who was going
to pay for this party?
A.

The estate.

Q.
You had already made that determination at that
time?
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A.
No, I perceived that whoever was going to be the
personal representative would acknowledge that as a
legitimate expense as the -- as I subsequently
acknowledged flowers and the other funeral expenses that
were incurred.
Exhibit 9 was admitted into evidence (R. 792) and was
Conder's letter explaining to Co-Personal Representative Snow the
"final party" which he know characterizes loftily as a "wake."
Conder, in his letter, explains:
Many of Chads friends, indeed a great majority
of his friends, were non church goers and
abhorred the concept of the type of funeral
that Chad's mother planned for him.
Chad
would absolutely have been appalled at a
church service. *** As a friend of Chads
family I spoke with his sister Karen DeVrese
about his mothers funeral plans. I also spoke
with Chads intended Diane and his brother Ron.
*** Additionally, since Diane, Karen and Ethel
are not exactly what you would
call
fundamentalist Christians, we felt it would be
appropriate to have an event where they could
feel comfortable and could greet their friends
and relatives. In short, a Mormon Ward house
is not a place where any of those who came
would feel comfortable.
Punch and cookies
from the Relief Society, although nice for
Elaine Husband, was not what Whity would have
wanted. *** If Ethel and or her attorney are
critical of this event or the expenditure they
are more petty than I thought.
Conder was examined on this letter at

(R. 793) as

follows:
Q.
Well, I just asked you if the letter is
truthful and correct.
A.

I have no reason -- yeah, sure.

There's no claim of a consultation with Dylon, Lindsay, Ethel or
Karen prior to the party. Dylon, Lindsay, Ethel and Karen attended
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the party, but no one specifically authorized the same in advance
of the party.
Karen Husband testified that she thought the party would
have been what Decedent wanted and she tried to pass the "final
party," off as a continuation of the funeral (R. 855-857).

Based

on the foregoing evidence, the trial court entered the following
Findings of Fact:
22. Subsequent to the funeral of decedent,
personal representative Jerrald D. Conder and
Karen Husband, guardian for Lindsay Husband,
an heir of decedent, authorized a party, or
"wake", in honor of decedent which was held at
Hidden Valley Country Club.
23. The cost of this "wake" was $1,772.21
which amount was paid for from estate assets.
24. The Court finds that this expense is not
properly chargeable to the estate and that the
cost of this "wake" should be borne equally by
personal representative Jerrald D. Conder and
Lindsay Husband's share of the estate. (R.
678)
Once again Cross-Appellants have failed to marshall the facts in
support of Findings of Fact 22, 23 and 24 and demonstrate "that the
evidence,

including

all

reasonable

insufficient to support the findings.

inferences

therefrom

are

Robb v. Anderton, supra.

Funeral expenses is defined in 34 C.J.S., Executors and
Administrators § 384, page 137 as follows:
The term "funeral expenses" has reference to
those necessary and compulsory expenditures
which arise immediately on and after the death
of decedent, and which embrace the coffining,
embalming,
arraying,
and
sepulture
or
cremation of his body, together with those
accustomed forms and ceremonies which attend
on the present disposition of his remains.
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And in Caswell v« Harry Miller Excavating Co., 246 N.E2d 921, 924,
(1969) :
The term "funeral expenses" includes necessary
expenditures arising from death of deceased
person for embalming, purchase of coffin,
burial or cremation, customary rites or
ceremonies attending disposition of remains,
and expenditures for burial lots and vaults.
And with respect to a legitimate "wake" in the case of In Re
Johnson/ s Estate. 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 1, 3 (1890) the court ruled as
follows:
If the evidence had shown that the wake, which
preceded the burial of the decedent, was made
an occasion of feasting or intemperance, its
expenses as an item of funeral charges, should
have been disallowed.
There is, however,
nothing reprehensible in the custom of
watching at night over a corpse; *** So the
courts, *** have refused to burden an estate
with the cost of a ceremony which, under the
pretense of honoring the dead, simply pandered
to the appetites of the living.
The fare
which in this instance was provided for the
guests and mourners was not open to this
criticism, and was exceptionally frugal; it
consisted of cheese and crackers and tobacco.
A banquet less provocative of hilarity could
not be imagined.
There is no basis in law for allowing the "final party, "
as an expense of the Estate and the trial court properly disallowed
this charge and reallocated it against Conder and Wangsgard's
attorney's fees and the heir whose mother-conservator thought it
was what Chad wanted and was appropriate.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND NO BASIS TO CHARGE APPELLANT DYLON
HUSBAND WITH ANY OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FEES OR ATTORNEY'S
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FEES INCURRED BY THE ESTATE WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court made Finding of Fact 9 (R. 676), in the
final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 672-682) used to
support the Estate Closing Order. (R. 683, 684)

Finding of Fact 9

is a follows:
The Court finds that there is no basis for
charging personal representatives or attorneys
fees incurred
in conjunction with the
administration of the estate directly to Dylon
Husband.
1.

Cross-Appellants

first

attack

surcharge Personal Representative Conder

the

Petition

to

(R. 464-479) as being

without merit. A look at these seven causes of action is in order.
A.

The First Cause of Action claims negligence,

bad faith, conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty
costing the Estate $113,755.00. This claim had sufficient merit to
necessitate a full blown hearing on July 2, 1992. (R. 1158-1226)
Appellant called two witnesses and adduced substantial evidence to
support his claims. The trial court made a ruling on the evidence
in favor of Personal Representative Conder and nowhere did the
court state that the claim was without merit. (R. 122 6)
B.
interest

on

The Second Cause of Action had to with the

the estate

funds which

is before

the

court

in

Appellant's brief, Point IV, page 31 and in Appellee's brief, Point
IV, page 39.
C.

The Third Cause of Action had to do with the

"final party" and is before this court in Appellee's brief, Point
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VIII, page 52 and in Cross-Appellant's brief, Point VIII.
D.

The Fourth Cause of Action charged that Diane

Mills, the fiancee, girlfriend, live-in, etc., of Decedent at the
time of his death was also a former client of Conder & Wangsgard
and Conder as Personal Representative allowed Mills to live in
Decedent's solely owned home at 1539 East Harvard Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah rent free for 2% months after he became Personal
Representative. The reasonable rental value of the property would
have been $750.00 per month or a total of $2,062.50. The evidence
clearly showed that Mills was a former client of Conder's and he
allowed her to live in the house after Decedent's death on a rent
free basis. (R. 798-801)
E.

The Fifth Cause of Action claims Conder allowed

Diane Mills to use Decedent's 1988 Chevrolet Camero IROC Z from the
date of Decedent's death to September, 1990, a period of three
months, in which Mills put 8,000 miles on the vehicle.

The

evidence adduced by Plaintiff showed that the fair rental value was
$800.00 per month (R. 747-748) and that Conder either allowed or
was aware and failed to object to the use of the car by Mills (R.
801-804; 840-843) and should have been surcharged $2,400.00.
F.

The Sixth Cause of Action claims that Conder

gave to Diane Mills property belonging to the Decedent which
included a stereo, living room set, dining room set, Lazy Boy
recliner, couch and love seat, drift boat, camping equipment
including a spring bar tent, a 2 person tent, Coleman stoves and
lanterns, a large Coleman heater, a small Coleman heater and
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several coolers, all of which was reasonably with the sum of
$3,000.00.

Appellant adduced substantial evidence to support the

claim. (R. 804-814; 843-845)
G.

The Seventh Cause of Action claims that Conder

gave Decedent's golf clubs and a naugahyde couch to Decedent's
brother.

Evidence was adduced by Appellant to support this claim.

(R. 814; 827, 828)
While the court may have found six of the seven claims
without merit, the claims had evidence to support them, were
debatable legally
2,

and they were brought in good faith.

Cross-Appellants then claim Appellant should be

charged attorney's fees for having the Conder & Wangsgard claim for
fees approved by the Court.
It was clear from Appellant's Petition to Remove Conder
as Personal Representative that the main issue was whether the work
had actually been performed for Decedent. (R. 24) The main thrust
of Conder's deposition held on January 3, 1991 was whether (1)
there were any fees due Conder & Wangsgard from the Estate of
Decedent and (2) whether the claim had been presented, allowed and
paid in conformity with the Utah Uniform Probate Code. (R. 14221428; 1444-1456; 1459-1478)
At the hearing held on January 15, 1991 the trial court
ruled at (R. 931) as follows:
The
Court
will
appoint
a
Co-Personal
Representative who will review all of the acts
performed
by
the
present
Personal
Representative and he will solely approve or
disapprove the Conder-Wangsgard claim, and the
claim must be approved by the court.
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The stipulation entered into by Conder, Appellant's
attorney and Guyon (R. 190-193) provided in part as follows:
2.
The
newly
appointed
Co-Personal
Representative will review all of the acts of
the present Personal Representative and report
on the said acts of to the Court and all
parties hereto as to the current state of the
probate; and the said newly appointed CoPersonal Representative will solely approve or
disapprove of the Conder and Wangsgard claim
for
attorney's
fees
in
the
sum
of
approximately $33,000.00 and the method of
payment thereof which determination shall be
made from evidence submitted by the interested
parties and which claim for attorney's fees
must be further approved by the Court.
The method of payment refers to cash or the remodel job to be
performed by Decedent's construction company.
The

stipulation

further provided,

"the

court

shall

conduct a hearing on the question of (1) attorney's fees to be
awarded, (2) surcharges and other objections to the closing of the
Estate....".

(R. 193)

John Spencer Snow, having been appointed by the Court as
a Co-Personal Representative on February 22, 1991 (R. 194) did not
report at any time to the court with reference to the Conder &
Wangsgard claim.

The next thing that happened was that K.C.

Bennett an attorney for Conder & Wangsgard and representing the
"Personal Representative" filed a petition dated May 3, 1991 to
submit for approval "the claim of Conder & Wangsgard for attorney's
fees for legal services provided to the Decedent during his
lifetime in the amount of $33,248.75 plus interest of $4,572.06 for
a total amount of $37,820.81." (R. 250, 251)
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Mr. Bennett obtained a hearing date on May 11, 1991 and
a backup date on May 16, 1991. (R. 259) Appellant's attorney filed
an objection to both of these hearing dates to the petition for the
Conder & Wangsgard attorney's fees on five separate grounds, one of
which was that John Spencer Snow had failed to make his report to
the Court on the Conder and Wangsgard claim for attorney's fees and
the method of payment thereof. (R. 253)
Appellant's attorney filed a response to the petition for
attorney's fees for Conder & Wangsgard (R. 269-272) and the initial
hearing was held on the Conder & Wangsgard claim for attorney's
fees on June 14, 1991.
The claim that Appellant reneged on the terms of the
stipulation and was in direct violation of the stipulation is
preposterous in light of the record in this matter.
Mr. Snow was in default in his failure to report.

It

should be noted that Mr. Snow and Conder expeditiously sold the
Decedent's construction business as of May 2, 1991 (the petition
for the fees being dated May 3, 1991) so that the Conder &
Wangsgard fees would have to be paid in cash and not in remodeling
work on the Conder & Wangsgard office. (R. 190-206)
Cross-Appellant's are trying to require Appellant to pay
their attorney's fees for pursuing their own claim for attorney's
fees incurred prior to Decedent's death which the trial court
specifically would not allow.

In fact, the trial court disallowed

$5,000.00 when it should have disallowed $11,500.00 as the true and
correct

figure

for processing

this
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claim

against

their

own

Decedent's estate.
3.

Cross-Appellant

next

attacks

Dylon

Husband,

Appellant for his petition to remove Conder and his questioning of
all other acts in conjunction with that role.
Appellant refers to and incorporates herein by reference
all of the arguments, record on appeal, and authorities cited in
this brief and Appellant's brief to support the trial court's
finding of no basis for charging Appellant with estate, personal
representative or attorney's fees.
A.

In addition thereto:

Appellant was only 17 at the time of the

appointment of Conder as Personal Representative and his interest
was represented by his mother, who had been appointed Conservator.
Appellant was incompetent to nominate or object to or approve the
appointment of Conder as Personal Representative contrary to the
argument in Cross-Appellant's brief. (R. 839)
B.

Conder failed to disclose the Decedent's debt

for attorney's fees to Conder & Wangsgard prior to his obtaining
waivers and securing his appointment as Personal Representative in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-611 (2) (b) . (R. 24; 910-914;
1049-1052; 1417-1422)
C.

Conder received the support and testimony of

Karen Husband, Conservator of the Estate of Lindsay Husband, the
other heir, and the testimony and support of Peter Guyon, her
attorney throughout the proceedings.

It is submitted that the

reason for this support was due to Karen Husband's claim for
alimony and support in the approximate sum of $4,500.00 which was
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challenged by Appellant in his objections to the Petition for the
Approval of Final Settlement and Distribution. (R. 484-488)

The

particulars of the objection being set forth in detail at (R. 485) .
The claim for past due alimony and support money was supposedly
made on June 21, 1990, but was not approved until April 2, 1992.
(R. 710; 727-730)

The claim of June 21, 1990 was not paid even

though there were sufficient funds as early as July 5, 1990 with
which to pay the said claim. (R. 107)

This was a payoff to Karen

Husband and her attorney for their testimony and support of Conder
in this and other matters in light of their failure to file a
timely claim for the alimony and support money.
D.

Conder, as Personal Representative was allowed

to testify and repeatedly misstated the facts for the trial court
involving

dealings

with Appellant's

attorney

and

Appellant's

attorney made repeated efforts to testify and place the truth
before the trial court.

These efforts were rejected by the trial

court for ethical reasons and the trial court wanted Appellant's
attorney to withdraw and for Appellant to hire a new attorney as if
there were not enough attorneys involved and attorney's fees being
run up at this point. (R. 769-771; 773-774)
B.

Throughout all of the proceedings Conder's

testimony on occasion was untruthful (R. 1031-1048), evasive and
non-responsive. (R. 749-752)

The remarks in Appellant's brief

under Point V about Conder are incorporated herein for the court's
further consideration.
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All of Appellant' s petitions, objections, surcharges were
successful,

partially

successful

and

if

unsuccessful

always

supported by evidence, had a basis in law therefor, and were
asserted in good faith.

This was readily apparent to the trial

court during the pendency of this action and was the reason for his
finding of no basis for awarding attorney's fees or other charges
as against Appellant, Cross-Appellant has again failed to marshall
the facts in accordance with Robb v. Anderton, supra. The findings
and order of the trial court should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
All issues and points on appeal raised by Cross-Appellant
should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully submitted,

Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Appellant and
Cross-Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

)%

day of April, 1994,

true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant
and Brief of Cross-Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to Peter
W. Guyon, Attorney for Lindsay Husband, 14 Newhouse Building, 10
Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Scott R. Wangsgard,
Attorney for Personal Representatives, 4059 South 4000 West, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84120.
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